8 June 1944

8 June 1944

05:07 — The Channel Islands Sea Defence Command reported that Coastal Battery 5./1265 (Jersey) had opened fire at 04:20 on radar-located enemy targets in grid square BF 3575, upper-right corner. At 04:26 and 04:27 the target could no longer be made out. Ammunition expenditure: eight rounds of 15.5 cm. [T-1022/2174, PG 38468, scan 0309]

The Channel Islands reported a quiet sea and air situation during the morning, and no landing or immediate invasion threat was observed.

In Normandy, enemy vessels remained off the north Cotentin and the invasion beaches. Reports continued from Batterie Marcouf and other isolated positions, while information from the Vire–Orne sector was incomplete. The command tracked fighting, ship movements, landing traffic and the threat that enemy forces might cut the Cotentin Peninsula.

The H.K.A.A. 1255 battle report recorded extensive fire on land and sea targets. Its batteries fired on the beach at Franceville, unloading operations at Riva Bella, infantry north of the church at Merville, a landing vessel, enemy infantry west of Franceville, bridges at Bénouville and Ranville, cruisers and rocket-launching craft in the Orne mouth. Observers reported fire on target and hits in several missions, while other shoots ended when ships made smoke or moved out of range.

The wider assessment discussed enemy pressure toward Granville and Coutances, continued large naval concentrations off the bridgehead, the uncertain situation around Ouistreham, and the condition and ammunition state of batteries including Marcouf and 2./1261. German commanders expected the enemy to widen and connect the bridgeheads while using naval gunfire and air superiority to suppress surviving coastal guns.

A command assessment attached to the diary reviewed the first lessons of the invasion. It concluded that the long preparation had been recognised but that the precise time and weight of the landing had not. Coastal batteries had nevertheless offered sustained resistance. The paper argued for mobile coastal artillery reserves and observed that bombing had not made properly bunkered guns useless, although crews, communications and equipment outside the shelters remained highly vulnerable.

The assessment further noted that the enemy fleet concentration had been difficult to locate and that intelligence estimates had proved inadequate in important respects. It also stressed the operational importance of demolishing the Ouistreham locks and the Caen Canal installations, whose condition was still uncertain. These conclusions were preliminary German judgments written while the battle was continuing.

Roll 2174, PG 38468, scans 0309–0319; supplementary battle report at PG 38469, scans 0598–0600.