8 July 1940

8 July 1940 Amended report on the occupation of the Channel Islands

Editorial note: Filed under the report date of 8 July; the account concerns preparations in June and occupation from 30 June to 2 July 1940. Amended dates, contemporary claims and uncertain readings are retained.

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Naval Commander Northern France, G 916 [reference partly overwritten], 8 July 1940. Draft. To Commanding Admiral France, with two copies for onward transmission to Naval High Command and Naval Group Command West. Copy to Naval Sector Normandy.

Report on the occupation of the British Channel Islands, 30 June–2 July 1940.

General.
After German troops occupied Normandy and Brittany, the question of occupying the neighbouring large Channel Islands, which were in British possession, came to the fore. The Kriegsmarine took up the matter. In enemy hands, the islands constituted an advanced observation position on our flank, to the detriment of our naval and air operations in the central and western Channel.

Responsibility for carrying out the occupation [continues on the next frame].

Handwritten additions below: A signal to Naval Group Command West on 20 June raised the question of securing the flank through the Channel Islands; reconnaissance and a surprise occupation using S-boats and R-boats were considered. A further signal reference, 1537/63 of 20 June, is cited. [Much of the remaining handwritten wording is too indistinct for reliable translation.]

Editorial note: A working draft with deletions and insertions. The typed account is translated and legible substantive amendments are identified; the historical claims are those of the report.

Channel Islands occupation draft — intelligence and preparations

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…was assigned to Naval Commander Northern France by Naval War Staff 1/Skl Ic 8639/40 top secret of 20 June 1940. Handwritten amendment: the written order was delivered by courier from Admiral France on 26 June.

Information on the islands' defences.
No clear information was available. The fortifications were described as obsolete and limited in extent. Nevertheless, recent reinforcement remained possible; it had to be assumed that Britain intended to defend possession of the islands stubbornly.

Preparatory measures.
To obtain more precise information, Air Fleet Command 2, and later Air Fleet Command 3, were requested to carry out photographic reconnaissance. The Naval Assault Battalion was earmarked for the occupation, reinforced by Army elements. A seaborne operation was envisaged, using the S-boat and R-boat flotillas operating in Northern French waters. All locally available vessels were to be made ready for transport. Shipping capacity found was very small; bringing vessels from the Netherlands or Germany seemed unavoidable.

The idea of a surprise seizure had to be abandoned when the first aerial photographic results arrived. Interpretation indicated numerous coastal and harbour fortifications on all three islands; large vehicle columns and transports were also observed in the harbours, suggesting military unloading. After contact with Air Fleet 2 and local Army commanders, a surprise capture was considered militarily inadvisable, because surprise was lacking and this would be the first seizure of British soil. For the intended operation, see Naval Commander Northern France 152/40 top secret of 26 June 1940.

Further reconnaissance by Air Fleet 3 showed no countermeasures on the islands. It could not, however, be concluded that the islands were undefended against air or sea attack. [Deleted sentence: The complete disregard of German aircraft seemed suspicious.] To clarify matters, Air Fleet 3 carried out armed reconnaissance [handwritten date 28 June]. Several hits were scored in Saint Peter Port harbour installations. Large fires, several explosions and heavy lorry and passenger-car traffic were observed at Saint Helier and Saint Peter Port. Only light anti-aircraft [continues].

Channel Islands occupation draft — decision to land

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…defence. The reconnaissance information then available suggested that the islands were being evacuated, at least in part, by civilians or military personnel. Although anti-aircraft opposition was not strong, it seemed established that the islands were occupied militarily, and artillery or mine opposition to approaching ships was not unlikely. Air Fleet 3 promised further reconnaissance using stereoscopic photographs of the fortifications.

On 30 June 1940 Naval Commander Northern France, accompanied by AI, was in Paris for discussions with Commanding Admiral France. [Deleted: Discussions were also held with Air Fleet 3 and Army Group B.] It emerged that during further reconnaissance in force, Captain Liebe-Pietrit [spelling in the draft], commander of an air-reconnaissance group, had landed on Guernsey with several reconnaissance aircraft without encountering resistance at the airfield. A Reuters report broadcast by British radio also announced that the Channel Islands had been evacuated militarily.

Immediate occupation therefore appeared necessary and was planned for 0900 on 1 July 1940. Air Fleet 3 promised ten Junkers transport aircraft. Reconnaissance, fighter and bomber units were also to be held ready in the Cherbourg area to protect the operation. Army Group B ordered X Army Corps to provide Army troops at the Naval Commander's request.

Execution of the occupation.
On the evening of the same day, a platoon of Luftwaffe soldiers was landed by Junkers transports to reinforce the reconnaissance aircraft which had landed on Guernsey with Captain Liebe-Pietrit. Earlier, the reconnaissance aircraft had thwarted an attack by British aircraft, one German aircraft shooting down two Bristol Blenheims [claim in the source].

At 0830 on 1 July 1940, the Naval Assault Battalion and a requested Army company were ready to embark at Cherbourg airfield. Embarkation was delayed because ground fog had held up the Junkers transports at their departure airfield. With only ten transport aircraft available, the islands had to be occupied in succession; Guernsey was selected first. The following embarkation order was issued: [continues].

[Handwritten insertion between paragraphs refers to orders during the night of 30 June–1 July and Infantry Regiment 396; full wording uncertain.]

Channel Islands occupation draft — Guernsey, Jersey and Alderney

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1. Naval Assault Battalion.
2. A light anti-aircraft platoon, withdrawn from the Cherbourg area with Air Fleet Command 3's agreement, to secure Guernsey airfield after landing.
3. An Army infantry company, with a battalion in reserve [unit numbers amended in handwriting; I. R. 396 is legible].

The first flight of transport aircraft took off at about 1400. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe personnel already landed had demanded the island's surrender. A surrender document was already available when the first wave of the Naval Assault Battalion landed. The island was occupied according to plan.

It was ordered that Jersey should also be occupied by part of the Naval Assault Battalion and the infantry companies held in reserve. Reconnaissance aircraft had meanwhile landed there too and established that the island was ready to surrender. The occupation was carried out during the evening [handwritten amendment: on 2 July]. A light anti-aircraft platoon was likewise employed there to establish air defence.

On both islands, port-surveillance personnel took over the harbour installations and secured the numerous small vessels. Cable stations were occupied, the connection to Britain cut and steps taken to put the Guernsey–Jersey–Cherbourg cable into operation. Radio stations were occupied, and the light and radio beacons were taken out of service.

Occupation of Alderney was planned for early the following morning. As there was no adequate landing ground for aircraft, Cherbourg Port Commandant Lieutenant Koch was ordered to cross to Alderney in vessels taken into service, with port-surveillance personnel reinforced by soldiers of the Naval Assault Battalion.

It had meanwhile been established that the British garrison had left the islands [the typed phrase “four weeks earlier” is deleted and replaced by an indistinct amendment]. Mines had not been laid because the island population depended on sea traffic. On 2 July 1940 two Luftwaffe Fieseler Storch aircraft landed on Alderney and established that the island was completely deserted. Three vessels belonging to Cherbourg Port Commandant also landed and took possession of the island.

Channel Islands occupation draft — subsequent plans

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Further intentions.

Because of the islands' extent, including a town of 42,000 inhabitants [as stated], their protection was appropriately transferred to the Army, 216th Infantry Division. The Naval Assault Battalion was withdrawn to take part in the parade in Paris. At present, the Navy has only port-surveillance personnel in the island harbours.

Since the islands cannot at present be considered to have practical value for naval warfare, apart from emergency harbours for R-boats and S-boats, and reconnaissance so far has found no usable fortifications, the transfer of naval artillery units, in addition to port-surveillance personnel for harbour and defensive duties, is not considered necessary. A detailed investigation of the fortifications has been initiated. Once sea communications are established, heavy anti-aircraft batteries capable of engaging air and sea targets are considered suitable artillery protection. A corresponding request has been submitted to Air Fleet Command 3.

Communication with the mainland is currently maintained by six Junkers transports of Air Fleet 3, pending establishment by Cherbourg Port Captain of a regular steamer service to Cherbourg adapted to the tides. A search for suitable vessels is in progress.

Handwritten additions: The Army has Infantry Regiment 396 on Jersey and Guernsey. Six 2 cm guns and six 3.7 cm guns are available, but there are still no heavy anti-aircraft guns. [Further text concerns shipping and the position of Alderney; several phrases are not reliably legible.] Final note: It is assumed that signal 1955/50 of 5 July has thereby been dealt with. [A cancelled paragraph and several marginal annotations remain illegible.]

T-1022 Roll 2440, T1022_R2440_English_Translation.docx. Archive and frame references follow.