6 April 1942

6 April 1942 St Malo lock and navigation-light failures: V 204 report

Secret. Copy. Vp boat 204, Annex I to the diary of 1–15 April 1942. Report by Leutnant zur See Pluns, commander, concerning the convoy of 6/7 April. [The report has no separate issue date; placed with the described operation.]

Under the employment order, V 204 entered the lock at 20:30 behind Holland and secured behind it on the north side. When the gate was not closed, I spent considerable time unsuccessfully trying to find the person responsible. I eventually found a Matrosengefreiter who said he was in charge. He told me that, contrary to the order known to me and surely to the harbour captain, H 2 and V 211 were also to enter. I explained that this was plainly impossible because of the ships’ lengths. Nevertheless H 2 entered with two tugs and secured on the south side, being driven quite hard against V 204 by the stiff south-westerly wind.

V 211 was called by Morse signal from the lock to cast off and enter as well. H 2 was already inside; even a man with poor judgement of distances should have realised the impossibility. In the increasing darkness I succeeded in reaching the person responsible and, on my own authority, ordered him to close the lock. Only after V 211 had anchored again in the inner harbour in front of the lock was the gate finally closed at 21:38. At 21:50 the convoy passed out without V 211. With night falling and rain squalls, I took it through the Chenal de la Petite Porte and anchored north of Grand Jardin lighthouse to await V 211.

At about 22:50 the entrance lights were suddenly extinguished. V 211’s commander shortly afterwards signalled that he had anchored in the fairway south of Grand Jardin and was waiting for the lights to be relit. The Convoy Control Office had ordered measures NX and NF from dusk until 22:45. V 211’s commander, Leutnant zur See Martienssen, later told me that, in view of this, before sailing he had asked the responsible soldier to keep the lights burning until at least 23:00. They were relit about 23:20, allowing V 211 to leave.

Consequences of this faulty organisation: (1) danger to the smaller vessels Holland and V 204, moored to leeward, from admitting the larger H 2 to windward; (2) substantial delay through arbitrary and senseless alteration of the lock order—the convoy could have been ready in the roads by 22:15 had the ordered sequence been followed; (3) grave danger to V 211 through premature extinction of the lights.

Lessons: (a) consider vessel sizes beforehand when deciding which will share the lock; do not establish this by trial and error. (b) In a crosswind, allocate the windward side to the smaller vessels when large and small vessels enter together, especially if the smaller enter first. (c) If passage through the lock is unexpectedly delayed, the lock watch must immediately ensure that the entrance lights remain on until the convoy has certainly reached open sea. (d) These important duties cannot be entrusted to a man who has demonstrated inadequate seamanship and organisation. A man of at least Feldwebel rank should be assigned, as he can assert authority more effectively over civilian masters. The Matrosengefreiter in charge was a farmer in civilian life. This was no isolated occurrence; other flotilla commanders and I have often experienced similar incidents. Signed Pluns, Leutnant zur See and commander.

T-1022 Roll 2423, PG 38000, scans 0310–0312.