5 October 1943

5 October 1943 Division comments convoy formations Normandie II and Mazagan

Editorial note: Retrospective review of August operations. Its explanation of Normandie II’s engine use qualifies the allegation in Mehlem’s 24 August report. The Mazagan assessment concerns the loss of 29 August, not a further loss.

Secret. Commander, 3rd Security Division, 5 October 1943, G 6562 AIII. To Commander of Security Forces West, two copies; copy to 46th Minesweeping Flotilla. Subject: diary for 16–31 August 1943. Five enclosures. Diary submitted in one copy; engineering section in duplicate. Questionnaire on performance of motor-boat and auxiliary-vessel formations for August enclosed in duplicate.

Group A diary, 29 August, 23:34, page 6: the positions of escort boats in the convoy are criticised. There is no protection astern. One boat should instead have exchanged places with steamer Lussac. Contribution 1, Group A: M 4626 was operationally subordinate to 2nd Security Division during passage from Antwerp to Cherbourg, so no comments are made here.

Contribution 1, Group B: when three or more boats escort a convoy, the leader should not serve as the guide boat, but take a position allowing greater freedom of movement, for example as a flank escort.

Contribution 1, Group B, 24 August, 00:25, pages 16 and 19: Saint-Malo escort office reports concerning Normandie: investigation showed that Normandie II's master did not refuse to restart his engine, but complied with the order to follow immediately only at half speed, to avoid the sparks produced at full engine output. Earlier too he had used only half speed because he claimed to have seen a motor torpedo boat and did not wish to reveal himself through sparks. As a result the convoy waited over an hour by Minquiers South buoy and finally continued without him. The Sea Transport Chief Channel Islands accepted that the tug captain had acted with the best intentions, but instructed and warned him that the escort leader's orders must be obeyed without qualification.

Group C diary: contrary to the normal rule, this group's leader must also act as guide boat, since navigational facilities aboard the other boats are substantially inferior.

29 August, 01:45, pages 32/33 and 37: Saint-Malo escort office comments that the convoy originally consisted of two vessels each for Jersey and Guernsey, to be protected by four Group C boats. After two postponements owing to weather, escorts had been requested for additional vessels; M 4600's failure left only three escort boats. The intention to make the convoy less concentrated by dividing it or to provide stronger protection therefore had to be abandoned. Mazagan was lost only after release from convoy, so the escort leader bears no blame.

It is noteworthy that enquiries into why no report of Mazagan's condition was made after grounding disclosed that the French master and German signal rating could not communicate: one spoke no German and the other no French.

Contribution 1, Group C: M 4603 and M 4606 were operationally subordinate to 2nd Security Division from 16 to 28 August, so no comments are made for that period. Otherwise no comments. [Signature.]

T-1022 Roll 3129, 46th Minesweeping Flotilla and reviewing commands. Supplied English translation T1022_R3129_English_Translation.docx. Record 482 | Source PDF scans 482, 483, 484.