18 July 1942
Summary
Air attack or aircraft engagement. Air or sea observations. Shipping and convoy movements
Location Details
Jersey; Guernsey; Alderney; St Malo; Granville; Cherbourg
Diary Entry
18 July 1942 — St Malo Convoy Control Office
Weather: north to north-west, fresh breeze to strong wind; occasional showers; moderately rough sea; visibility 5 nautical miles.
04:30, Guernsey — V 203/02 arrived with a convoy from St Malo. 06:15, St Malo — V 711/24 arrived with a convoy from Guernsey. 09:00 — Escort requests: (1) combined daytime convoy Guernsey–Granville; corresponding orders issued to M 4605/1. (2) Night troop convoy Jersey–Alderney; V 203/02 ordered to proceed from Guernsey to Jersey with the convoy under item 1. (3) Night troop convoy Guernsey–Alderney; V 209/04 ordered to proceed by day from Cherbourg to Guernsey without a convoy, carry out the Guernsey–Alderney troop convoy and, on arrival at Alderney on 19 July, proceed to St Malo without a convoy. (4) Night troop convoy St Malo–Jersey; corresponding orders issued to V 711/24.
13:00, Guernsey — M 4605/1 sailed for Granville with the combined convoy. 13:30 — V 203/02 sailed for Jersey with a convoy.
For the inspection voyages planned for 21 July by the Chief BSW and the Commanding Admiral, I intended to employ V 206/04 and V 208/02 respectively. I therefore ordered V 209/04, after completing the night convoy, to wait at Alderney for V 203/02. New pairs V 209/203 and V 202/04 were to be formed; the former would proceed to Cherbourg and the latter to St Malo as ordered. [The source refers to “night convoy item 2” here, although the earlier V 209/04 instruction is item 3.]
Situation reported to the 3rd Security Division for 18 July: (1) V 713/211 daytime convoy Cherbourg–Alderney. (2) V 204/09 unescorted Cherbourg–Guernsey voyage, then Guernsey–Alderney night troop convoy with Georgi. (3) V 203/02 completing the St Malo–Guernsey convoy with Rob. Müller 8 and Minotaure, then Guernsey–Jersey with a convoy [source reference “Pos. 5” retained], then Jersey–Alderney night troop convoy on 18/19 July with RO 21. (4) V 711/24 completing the Guernsey–St Malo night troop convoy with Holland and Nordplain, then St Malo–Jersey with H 49 on 18/19 July. (5) M 4605/01 Guernsey–Granville with Saigon, St. à Pitre and Pondicherry, then Granville readiness. (6) V 206 St Malo readiness. (7) M 4604 minor repairs at St Malo. Escorted tonnage: 10,700 GRT.
Intentions for 19 July: (1) V 713/211 at Position Carmen during the night of 18/19 July, then an Alderney–Cherbourg daytime convoy if required. (2) Newly formed pair V 203/09 to proceed promptly Alderney–Cherbourg. (3) Newly formed pair V 202/04 to proceed promptly Alderney–St Malo. (4) V 711/24 to finish the night troop convoy, then escort H 49, without troops, Jersey–Guernsey. (5) M 4605/01 combined convoy Granville–Jersey. (6) V 206 St Malo readiness. (7) V 208 fitting out at St Malo. (8) M 4604 minor repairs at St Malo.
16:40, Jersey — V 203/02 arrived with a convoy. 17:35, Alderney — V 204 arrived after the engagement. 18:20 — Telephone report from Sea Transport Officer Cherbourg concerning V 209/04’s anti-aircraft engagement near Alderney; no further details initially.
18:30 — I telephoned Alderney and spoke to V 204’s commander, Leutnant zur See Hionsch [name uncertain]. V 209/04 had been attacked by twelve Spitfires. V 204 received two bomb hits on the forepart; the 3.7-cm twin anti-aircraft mounting was badly damaged, partly fallen overboard and partly thrown onto the foredeck. The fire beneath the forecastle was being extinguished and the magazine flooded. The commander’s cabin in front of the bridge was hit. Three dead and nine seriously wounded were reported. The boat lay at Alderney and was initially unable to sail. Two Spitfires were claimed shot down in flames and destroyed. V 209 had not yet arrived, apparently because of machinery damage.
18:40 — Preliminary report of the engagement made by telephone to the Chief of Staff of the Commander of Security Forces West. 18:55, Alderney — V 209 arrived after the engagement. 19:45 — I telephoned Alderney. V 209 had arrived with machinery damage; three dead and five seriously injured were reported. Its commander could not be reached at that time.
22:00, Granville — M 4605/1 arrived with a convoy from Jersey. 22:40, Jersey — V 203/02 sailed for Alderney with RO 8. 22:45, St Malo — M 711/24 [as printed; V 711/24 elsewhere] sailed for Jersey with H 49. [RO 8 in the sailing entry differs from RO 21 in the situation summary.]
During further telephone calls to Alderney to resolve contradictions, I was informed that V 209’s commander, Oberleutnant zur See Stock, had been killed. I instructed V 211’s commander, who was at Alderney, to establish the remaining necessary facts.
23:45 — Based on his report I sent the following teletype report to the Commander of Security Forces West, with the 3rd Security Division informed: Anti-aircraft engagement on 18 July 1942, 17:00–17:04, in grid 3543. Twelve Spitfires attacked repeatedly from different directions in a star-shaped pattern. Twelve bombs were dropped in all; two hit V 204 from very low altitude. One hit from starboard entered the commander’s living quarters in front of the bridge, completely destroying the compartment. Secret documents were destroyed except for a small quantity recovered. The bomb penetrated the bunker; the hull plating above water was torn open and had now been shored up. The second hit struck the forecastle structure from above, causing fire and destroying the 3.7-cm twin anti-aircraft mounting, parts of which fell overboard. The degaussing installation failed; the electrical installation in the forepart was destroyed. Numerous 2-cm and machine-gun hits.
V 209 sustained numerous 2-cm and machine-gun hits, mainly on the bridge. The engine’s main steam pipe was damaged but had now been repaired. Two aircraft were claimed shot down in flames, with their impact on the water clearly observed. A third aircraft had its left wing burning and was losing altitude: probably shot down. A fourth aircraft trailed black smoke, lost altitude and broke out of formation. No further observation was possible because of the danger from fire and steam aboard. Radio equipment on both boats was unserviceable.
Final casualty lines: V 204, three dead, eleven seriously wounded and eleven slightly wounded. V 209, four dead including the commander, followed by “8” in an overprinted casualty line whose category cannot be read securely. [Earlier telephone totals above are retained as preliminary reports, rather than substituted for this later report.]
Continuation of the 23:45 report: both boats were able to sail and would proceed at 01:00 to Cherbourg under escort of V 713/211, carrying the dead and some of the wounded. The duration of their unavailability could not yet be estimated. The crews’ conduct was beyond reproach. Signed: Diederichs.
Source of Information
T-1022 Roll 2423, scans 0415–0417 (original pages 5–8).
