18 February 1943

18 February 1943 Review of St Malo diary, 1–15 January 1943

Page 4, 2 January, 0400: M 4613's radio station failing because its radio personnel [handwritten correction replacing “crew”] were seasick is a worrying consequence of the boat's crew being wholly inexperienced. With the current personnel situation such circumstances often cannot be changed, and failures must consequently be expected.

Pages 9–10, 5 January, 0226–0830: as established in the court-martial proceedings, Schokland's master was responsible for his ship's sinking. The patrol boats did everything humanly possible to rescue as many men as possible, despite the great danger of entering the rocks at night. The absence of effective support from Sea Transport Officer Jersey and the harbour-defence boats stationed there is regrettable. Sea Transport Officer Jersey's order for Holland to proceed alone to St Malo, instead of returning to St Helier with her men on leave aboard, is incomprehensible. The Convoy Control Office's measures were appropriate. [These are the review's statements about the proceedings and responsibilities.]

French fishing cutters: references are page 8, 4 January 1640; page 11, 5 January 0920; page 12, 5 January 2125 and 2320 and 6 January 0020 and 0120; page 13, 6 January 1330 and 1440; page 15, 7 January 1355; page 16, 7 January 1700. According to Harbour Commandant Lorient, ten individually named French fishing cutters were to transfer from Douarnenez to Calais. 3rd Security Division agreed for its area provided they travelled only by day close inshore. Their daily destinations, small ports to be entered, were specified. Harbour Surveillance Stations at those ports were to supervise the transfer and inform 3rd Security Division of the next day's intentions; from St Malo to the area boundary they were to inform St Malo Convoy Control Office. Events show that the cutters travelled rather arbitrarily in the Convoy Control Office's area because the Harbour Surveillance Stations apparently were themselves no better informed, and their reports were unreliable. Particular danger arose from the cutters' night passage, undertaken without the Convoy Control Office's knowledge. Coastal batteries near Cherbourg fired on them during it.

Pages 25–26, 14 January, 0010–1000: the Convoy Control Office's explanation of V 703's loss is endorsed. Improving berthing in Alderney harbour is essential. Naval Commandant Channel Islands has received a diary extract and been asked to pursue relocation of the harbour barrier. Until better berthing is available, the restricted space demands the greatest caution in ordering convoys to Alderney. Resuming daylight convoys between Alderney and Cherbourg is considered highly questionable in view of previous enemy fighter attacks. Our own fighter cover is usually unavailable and, unless accompanying the convoy, generally arrives too late. Signed by order [signature not confidently deciphered].

T-1022 Roll 2423, scans 0704–0706; 3rd Security Division, secret G 786 AII, dated 18 February 1943 [handwritten day], to Commander, Security Forces West in two copies, information copy to St Malo Convoy Control Office. No preceding correspondence; one enclosure. The diary for 1–15 January is submitted in one copy.