1 November 1944

Escort order and memorandum on principal berthing ports

1. The lighters Saigon and Tourane, protected by Vp. 229 and F.L. 13, are to depart Jersey at 07:30 on 1 November 1944, proceed via Ida 5a to Guernsey, and be led by the commander of B Group, 2nd Outpost Flotilla.

2. M 442/32 is to be at immediate readiness in Jersey from 08:00 as distant cover for item 1.

3. A.F. 65/71 is to depart Guernsey at 07:00 for Ida 5a and, after meeting the force in item 1, attach itself to it as reinforcement for the passage to Guernsey.

In considering the principal berthing ports for the seagoing formations under my command, four questions were of primary concern, although only two can be taken into account to any substantial extent:

1. The formations should, for reasons of discipline, military effectiveness, readiness and administration, be kept together as far as possible.

2. The second consideration is the capacity of the harbours.

The two main questions are these:

3. The convoys required to supply the islands must be adequately protected.

4. The naval forces must be stationed so that they can intervene effectively in the event of landings.

Regarding item 3: according to the Commander, Channel Islands’ latest intentions, one Jersey–Guernsey convoy per month will be required from November for island supply. Present experience indicates that these voyages are best made by vessels which cannot be detected, or can be detected only with difficulty. Among the escort vessels these are artillery ferries and naval fishing cutters; among the supply vessels, Rhine lighters. Both types require favourable weather with comparatively little sea. During winter weather it may therefore become necessary to replace the normal form of escort with coastal motor vessels and more seaworthy escort craft.

Regarding item 4: escort vessels can be used effectively against a landing, at full operational commitment, if they can get behind the landing craft and attack them from seaward during the landing, for example at night. Readiness and armament are decisive. Vessels armed only with 3.7 cm or 2 cm weapons are unsuitable.

Motor vessels of the escort formations require 30 minutes to one hour to reach material readiness; the minesweepers of the 24th Minesweeper Flotilla require 1½–2 hours; and the large fishing steamers of the 2nd Outpost and 46th Minesweeper Flotillas require 18–24 hours. This assumes that the steam vessels normally have their fires out because of the coal situation.

A further factor in the defence of Jersey is that particular account must be taken of the depths on the east side.

T-1022 Roll 2423, PG 37998, Commander of Sea Defences, Channel Islands. Source scan 0028 — original page 220